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Abstract
In this paper we propose one approach to implement environmental standards into Data En-
velopment Analysis (DEA) and in this way to measure its regulatory impact on eco–efficiency
of firms. As one basic feature of DEA models lies in the exogeneity of inputs, desirable and
undesirable outputs, it is not possible to introduce environmental constraints for these pa-
rameters directly into existing DEA models. Therefore, we implement the environmental
standard in a bounded–variable way, which allows constraints on the efficiency frontier. The
regulatory impact is assessed as difference in eco–efficiency scores before and after fictive
introduction of an environmental standard. Furthermore, we distinguish between weak and
strong disposability of undesirable outputs and develop according models.
Assessing the regulatory impact of environmental standards in advance provides support
for environmental policy makers in choosing appropriate instruments and in adjusting the
intensity of regulation. Moreover, the procedure can be applied in a wide range of markets,
as the proposed model framework offers several options. Policy makers can choose between
different environmental standards and different disposability assumptions.
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1 Introduction
In today’s political debates the concept of sustainability has become indispensable. The basic
idea behind this concept is that natural resources are finite and that ecological issues – in
particular pollution – cannot be ignored any more. In many cases the destruction of ecological
capital leads contemporaneously to an increase in gross domestic product and if there are no
costs associated with the former, long-term environmental costs are completely excluded from
economic analysis. Therefore, one of the most striking challenges in (environmental) economics
is the internalisation of negative external effects. Various concepts and models try to deal with
this issue. Our paper enters into the discussion as we refer to implementing environmental
standards in evaluating the eco–efficiency1 of different firms in a particular industry in order
to give incentives for less pollutant production. Moreover, in this way it is possible to measure
the regulatory impact on firms by comparing eco–efficiency scores before and after a fictive
introduction of an environmental standard. This can provide support for the environmental
policy makers in choosing appropriate instruments and intensity of regulation.
As it is rather difficult to quantify pollution, emissions or other undesirable outputs in monetary
units, we refer to data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric approach for multilateral
productivity comparisons. With this approach, which is extended in several ways, it is now
possible to ascertain the eco–efficiency of firms.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief literature
overview in DEA with a special focus on the measurement of eco–efficiency and the effects of
regulatory standards. Section 3 presents our basic idea using a fictive example of eight DMUs,
herein several variants of DEA–models that deal with undesirable outputs in the context of
eco–efficiency are applied and discussed. In section 4 we show how to implement our idea by
extending common slack–based measure models in the DEA field. Finally, the most important
findings are summarised and drawn together in a principal conclusion.
2 Literature
In efficiency analysis each firm, called decision making unit (DMU) in the Data envelopment
analysis (DEA) framework, is compared with the best practice frontier constructed by the whole
sample. Thereby, the relative technical efficiency of every DMU can be computed. DEA, going
back to Charnes et al. (1978), is a linear programming technique to estimate the efficiency
frontier, which is extensively applied in both, academic literature and practical world. It is also
widely used for environmental analysis, where undesirable outputs such as pollution or emissions
play a key role.2 Since undesirable outputs are jointly produced with desirable outputs the
incorporation into the measurement of overall performance is intensively discussed. A seminal
1Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) define eco-efficiency according to Heinz Felsner: We are looking for eco–efficient
solutions such that the goods and services can be produced with less energy and resources and with less waste and
emission.
2For a survey of DEA studies in the area of energy and environment, see Zhou et al. (2008).
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paper in this context is the one from Fa¨re et al. (1989), who have introduced the differentiation
between strong and weak disposability of outputs.The basic idea behind their concept is that,
given a certain amount of inputs, the higher the ratio between desirable and undesirable output
the higher is efficiency. In other words, firms should be penalised for the production of bad
outputs whereas higher production of (good) outputs, as usually, should have a positive effect
on efficiency. Fa¨re et al. (1996) introduce an environmental performance indicator based on
the decomposition of overall productivity into a pollution index and a productive efficiency
index. A comprehensive survey on the measurement of environmental performance is provided
by Tyteca (1996), who suggests three DEA model variations which also take undesirable outputs
into account. Moreover, a number of recent studies developed further extensions of Fa¨re et al.
(1989). Lozano and Gutierrez (2011) develop a modified slack–based DEA model which assumes
joint weak disposability of the desirable and undesirable outputs to compare the efficiencies of
airports. In another study Yang and Pollitt (2010) point out that the assumption of a uniform
disposability for all undesirable outputs brings different results in comparison to a model that
builds on technically correct disposability features for all undesirable outputs. Their model
specification is applied to a set of Chinese coal-fired power plants.
In literature different possibilities are distinguished how to include bad outputs into the DEA–
framework. According to Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) undesirable outputs can either be seen
as bad outputs or as inputs. While the explanation for the former is straightforward, undesirable
outputs can also be interpreted as inputs since both incur costs for a DMU. Within this logic
a DMU is trying to produce a given output with minimal inputs and undesirable outputs. The
main result of Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) was that the efficiency frontier, unlike the efficiency
scores of single firms, is independent of the way of including undesirable outputs.
In addition to the incorporation of undesirable outputs into the calculation of efficiency, it is also
possible to include regulatory standards. The first paper dealing with the impact of regulation
in the efficiency analysis was conducted by Fa¨re and Logan (1992). Using rate-of-return regu-
lation, the authors were able to determine the relationship between measures of regulated and
unregulated firms. The idea of implementing standards into the DEA framework was introduced
by Golany and Roll (1994). These standards do not necessarily have to be observed from the
real operations, but reflect both optimal output levels and corresponding minimal inputs.
One of the most important topics in recent environmental research is the question how emissions
can be reduced in order to meet predetermined climate goals, like for example the Kyoto-
protocol. There are different possibilities to decrease emissions, see e.g. Helfand (1991) or
Luptacik (2009). First, the absolute amount of emissions can be reduced with the consequence
that all emissions producing firms are treated equally independently of what they have done in
the past in order to cut emissions. A second possibility is intensity-regulation introduced by
Dudenho¨ffer (1984). Here, the emissions per unit of input have to be set below a predefined
benchmark, whereby those firms which have already invested in less polluting technologies in
the past have an advantage. Third, emissions per unit of output should not be higher than a
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given value. In this case, it is not clear that the level of emission will fall, since emissions can
increase as long as output rises.
3 Extensions of eco–efficiency models — our basic idea
In order to internalise negative external effects of pollution, we want to include environmental
standards in the efficiency evaluation of firms. This should help to identify the impact of intro-
ducing environmental standards as regulatory constraint.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), as one of the most common methods for measuring efficiency,
in particular its extensions for eco–efficiency, will constitute the basic framework. Within DEA
the efficiency is maximised over the chosen weights, whereas raw data of firms is treated as ex-
ogenously given. Therefore, it is not possible to incorporate constraints on inputs, desirable and
undesirable outputs directly. Consequently, we will first explain our basic idea and introduce
the methodological implementation later (in Section 4). Our idea contains two–steps:
1. Including the environmental standard in the efficiency frontier:
In general, all possibilities for environmental standards discussed in literature can be in-
cluded in the DEA framework. As mentioned in the Section 2, Luptacik (2009) and Helfand
(1991) distinguish three types of environmental standards:
• Intensity–regulation (Dudenho¨ffer (1984)): Emission
Input
≤ α1
• Emission per unit of output: Emission
Output
≤ α2
• Set level of emissions:3 Emission ≤ α3
As original firm data is exogenously given, we cannot incorporate constraints on inputs,
desirable and undesirable outputs directly. Therefore, especially the efficiency–frontier
projections of all firms have to fulfil the environmental standard. Figures 1 and 2 give
a graphical presentation of the introduction of intensity and emission per unit of output
regulation, respectively. Similar to the rate–of–return regulatory constraint implemented
by Fa¨re and Logan (1992), the introduced environmental standard cuts the efficiency fron-
tier. Herein, indicating regions not allowed by the regulator due to excessive undesirable
outputs (black part of the efficiency frontier). All firms, particularly including the ones
lying above the regulatory constraint (given as red line) need to be projected on that part
of the efficiency frontier where the environmental standard is guaranteed (blue part of the
efficiency frontier).
3Limitation on absolute amount of undesirable outputs.
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Figure 1: Intensity regulation
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Figure 2: Emission per unit of output regulation
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2. Using DEA models for eco–efficiency to compute the regulatory impact:
In a second step, the regulatory impact of an environmental standard can be assessed as
the difference in eco–efficiency scores before and after introducing the standard.4 This is
possible, as we are comparing identical DMUs. Different DEA models for measuring the
eco–efficiency of firms can be applied in general. Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) distin-
guish three input–oriented eco–efficiency models for a radial DEA framework, according
to treatment of inputs and emissions:
• Model A: Undesirable output (emission) is treated as negative output.
• Model B: Undesirable output is treated as input.
• Model C: Undesirable output is treated as input and input is treated as negative
output.
Nevertheless, in radial DEA models eco–efficiency scores need not contain all inefficiency
information. Additional slacks can appear for single firms which are not accounted in the
eco–efficiency score. This might lead to distorted results, as the regulatory impact of the
environmental standards is exclusively assessed via the comparison of eco–efficiency scores
before and after introducing the regulation. Therefore, slack–based measure models seem
to be advantageous for our purpose, as all slacks are included in the eco–efficiency scores.
4 Methodological approach
In this section we introduce our idea to evaluate the regulatory impact of environmental stan-
dards into the common DEA framework. We will illustrate the ideas using sample data. As our
extensions are beyond common solver software packages, we generated all results by solving the
models in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System).
As argued before, SBM models are more advantageous than radial models for our purpose, be-
cause all slacks are accounted in the eco–efficiency score. Therefore, we use the Undesirable
4Note that the regulatory impact can be computed for single firms (difference in single eco-efficiency scores) and
the whole industry (difference in average eco–efficiency scores).
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Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007) and a slack–based measure version of Model B from
Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) as starting points.
In order to create a slack–based measure version of Model B from Korhonen and Luptacik (2004),
we translate Model B from the radial DEA to the SBM framework keeping input orientation
and constant returns to scale. Equation (1) presents the translated Model B, which is called
SBM Model B in the remaining text.5
SBM version of Model B:
min
λ,s−,sb
ρ = 1−
1
m+ s2
(
m∑
i=1
s−i
xio
+
s2∑
r=1
sbr
ybro
) (1)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
ybo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo ≤ Y
gλ
λ, s−, sb ≥ 0
We implement the regulatory constraint for environmental standards by the idea of bounded
variables, which allows constraints on efficiency–frontier projections. The effect of the envi-
ronmental standard is a cut of the efficiency frontier, indicating regions not allowed by the
regulator due to excessive undesirable outputs. In evaluating the regulatory impact of environ-
mental standards it is crucial to distinguish between a strong and weak disposability assumption
of undesirable outputs. With v as the vector for good outputs, w as undesirable output vector, x
as input vector, P(x) as production technology, and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 Shepard (1970) and Kuosmanen
(2005) define undesirable outputs as strongly disposable if:
(v,w) ∈ P(x) implies (v, θw) ∈ P(x),
as weakly disposable via outputs if:
(v,w) ∈ P(x) implies (θv, θw) ∈ P(x),
and weakly disposable via inputs if:
(v,w) ∈ P(x) implies (v, θw) ∈ P((2− θ)x).
This means that strongly disposable undesirable outputs can be reduced costless, whereas weakly
disposable undesirable outputs can only be decreased when simultaneously decreasing outputs
or increasing inputs proportionally.
5The Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007) is provided in Appendix A.
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4.1 Strong disposability assumption
If strong disposability of undesirable outputs is assumed, the regulatory impact of environmen-
tal standards can be assessed as the difference of eco–efficiency scores between standard SBM
models (SBM Model B from Equation (1) and the Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al.
(2007)) and modified versions including the environmental standard. Herein, all environmental
standards (intensity, emission per unit of output and level–of–emission regulation) can be im-
plemented in a bounded–variable way.
4.1.1 SBM Model B
In order to extend the SBM Model B by the environmental standard we add a fourth constraint
constituting that projections on the efficiency frontier need to fulfil the environmental standard.
In Equation (2) the environmental standard is given as emission per unit of output regulation.6
This extended SBM Model B is called SBM Model B bounded in the remaining text.
SBM Model B including bounded variables:
(Emission per unit of output regulation)
min
λ,s−,sb
ρ = 1−
1
m+ s2
(
m∑
i=1
s−i
xio
+
s2∑
r=1
sbr
ybro
) (2)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
yo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo ≤ Y
gλ
0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α2Y
gλ
λ, s−, sb ≥ 0
Sample data In Section 4 we will illustrate our ideas using — for simplicity and without
loss of generality — an example of eight firms using one input to produce one desirable output
and one type of emission. Table 1 summarises the data of treated DMUs. As we will deal
with emission per unit of output as well as intensity regulation, the last two columns give the
according measures under consideration, respectively.
6For intensity or level–of–emission regulation, 0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α1Xλ or 0 ≤ Y
b
λ ≤ α3 have to be inserted as
environmental standard respectively.
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Table 1: Data of DMUs
Input Emissions Output Emission
Output
Emission
Input
A 20 13 10 1.3 0.7
B 15 24 10 2.4 1.6
C 19 30 10 3 1.6
D 11 55 10 5.5 5
E 13 62 10 6.2 4.8
F 31 43 10 4.3 1.4
G 24 50 10 5 2.1
H 20 20 10 2 1
Table 2 presents the eco–efficiency scores, ranks and reference sets of SBM Model B and SBM
Model B bounded with an environmental standard of α2 = 3.5 for the sample data. The results
of the two models are rather similar, except for the circumstance that all eco–efficient projec-
tions in SBM Model B bounded meet the environmental standard. Consequently, DMU D is no
longer a valid projection possibility at the efficiency frontier, which now ends at the intersection
with the regulatory constraint (D˜).7 Therefore, DMU D also has to be projected on point D˜ and
thus faces an efficiency loss of 24% as regulatory impact. Similarly DMU E which is projected
close to D in SBM Model B, has to be projected on D˜ in SBM Model B bounded, which causes
an efficiency loss of 5 percentage points. The efficiency of DMU G is not changing because
although DMU G is not fulfilling the emission per unit of output regulation, its projection on
the efficiency frontier (point A) does. Therefore, the optimal projection of DMU G is not altered
by the environmental standard. Summing up, the average regulatory impact over all eight firms
is calculated as an efficiency loss of 3 percentage points.
Table 2: Eco–efficiency Results — Emission per unit of output regulation
SBM Model B SBM Model B bounded Regulatory Impact
Score Rank Ref Score Rank Ref
DMU A 1 1 A 1 1 A
DMU B 1 1 B 1 1 B
DMU C 0.75 6 A,B 0.75 6 A,B
DMU D 1 1 D 0.76 3 D˜ 0.24
DMU E 0.82 5 B,D 0.77 5 D˜ 0.05
DMU F 0.47 8 A 0.47 8 A
DMU G 0.55 7 A 0.55 7 A
DMU H 0.83 4 A 0.83 4 A
∅ Efficiency 0.80 0.77 0.03
To evaluate the regulatory impact of the emission per unit of output regulation it is necessary
7For a graphical illustration see Figure 2.
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to solve SBM Model B bounded for different values of α2. If α2 is for instance set to 1.5, the
overall regulatory impact accounts to 12 percentage points, which is around four times the effect
of an environmental standard of α2 = 3.5. For α2 = 1, which would indicate that outputs and
undesirable outputs need to be equal, it would be most efficient for all firms to cease production
and leave the market. Detailed information about efficiency scores and regulatory impacts of
different environmental standards can be found in Appendix B.
4.1.2 Undesirable Output Model
The Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007) is extended in a similar way. Again,
one additional constraint on the set of possible projections is added. This fourth constraint
constitutes that projections on the efficiency frontier need to fulfil the environmental standard.
In Equation (3) the environmental standard is given as intensity regulation.8 This modified
model is called Undesirable Output Model bounded in the remaining text.
Undesirable Output Model including bounded variables:
(Intensity regulation)
min
λ,s−,s+
ρ =
1− 1
m
∑m
i=1
s−i
xio
1 + 1
s1+s2
(
∑s1
r=1
s
g
r
y
g
ro
+
∑s2
r=1
sbr
ybro
)
(3)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
ybo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo = Y
gλ− sg
0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α1Xλ
λ, s−, sg, sb, sWDr ≥ 0
Table 3 presents the eco–efficiency scores, ranks and reference sets of the Undesirable Output
Model and Undesirable Output Model bounded with an environmental standard of α1 = 2 for
the sample data. All eco–efficient projections in the Undesirable Output Model bounded meet
the environmental standards. This causes a necessary projection and resulting efficiency loss for
DMU D of 23% as regulatory impact.9 DMU E is also projected to D˜ and faces an efficiency loss
of 4 percentage points. The average regulatory impact of an intesity regulation of Emission
Input
≤ 2
over all eight firms is calculated as an efficiency loss of 3 percentage points.
8For emission per unit of output or level–of–emission regulation, 0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α2Y
g
λ or 0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α3 have to be
inserted as environmental standard respectively.
9DMU D is again projected on the intersection between efficiency frontier and environmental standard (D˜). For
a graphical illustration see Figure 1.
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Table 3: Eco–efficiency Results — Intensity regulation
Undesirable Output Model Undesirable Output Model bounded Regulatory Impact
Score Rank Ref Score Rank Ref
DMU A 1 1 A 1 1 A
DMU B 1 1 B 1 1 B
DMU C 0.72 6 B 0.72 6 B
DMU D 1 1 D 0.77 5 D˜ 0.23
DMU E 0.80 5 D 0.76 4 D˜ 0.04
DMU F 0.40 8 B 0.40 8 B
DMU G 0.49 7 B,D 0.49 7 B,D˜
DMU H 0.84 4 A,B 0.84 3 A,B
∅ Efficiency 0.78 0.75 0.03
In order to evaluate the regulatory impact of intensity regulation, α1 in the Undesirable Output
Model bounded is varied. If α1 is for instance set to 0.7, the overall regulatory impact accounts
to 4 percentage points, but the individual impacts differ. The big efficiency losers are DMU
B, D and E and due to the necessary projection of firm B DMUs C, F and G gain efficiency.
For α1 ≤ 0.7, all firms chose to cease production and leave the market. Detailed information
about efficiency scores and regulatory impacts of different intensity regulations can be found in
Appendix C.
4.2 Weak disposability assumption
If weak disposability of undesirable outputs is assumed, standard SBM models (SBM Model B
from Equation (1) and the Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007)) first have to
be adopted. The regulatory impact of environmental standards can subsequently be assessed
as the difference of eco–efficiency scores between the adopted standard SBM models including
weak disposability of undesirable outputs and extended versions additionally including the en-
vironmental standard.
In order to guarantee that the model accounts for weak disposability of undesirable outputs, we
add a weak disposability constraint. This means that if a firm has to lower its emissions in order
to be efficient, it simultaneously has to decrease outputs (weak disposability via outputs) or to
increase inputs (weak disposability via inputs). Weak disposability via outputs is more often
treated in literature, see e.g. Yang and Pollitt (2010), Shepard (1970) and Kuosmanen (2005),
and refers to short–term reductions of undesirable outputs within one production technology
with constant emission–coefficient. Contrary to this, weak disposability via inputs refers to
long–term changes in the production technology, achieved through investments which in turn
increase inputs.
As the input–oriented SBM Model B does not include output slacks, it is only possible to im-
plement weak disposability via inputs. The Undesirable Output Model is non–oriented and thus
includes slacks for inputs, undesirable outputs and desirable outputs. Nevertheless, undesirable
outputs are treated as outputs wherefore weak disposability can only be implemented via out-
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puts. Consequently, the two versions of weak disposability are separated in the two available
SBM models.
4.2.1 SBM Model B
Equation (4) presents our extensions for weak disposability via inputs in SBM Model B. The
fourth constraint assures that the relative decrease in undesirable outputs is accompanied by a
proportional increase in inputs. A necessary input increase results in a positive slack for weak
disposability (sWDr ) which enters the objective function. Any weak disposability slack will lower
the efficiency of the respective firm. This model is called SBM Model B weak in the remaining
text.
SBM Model B including weak disposability via inputs:
min
λ,s−,sb
ρ = 1−
1
m+ 2s2
(
m∑
i=1
s−i
xio
+
s2∑
r=1
sbr
ybro
+
s2∑
i,r=1
sWDr
xio
) (4)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
yo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo ≤ Y
gλ
sbr
ybro
=
sWDr
xio
λ, s−, sb, sWDr ≥ 0
Subsequently the environmental standard is implemented in a bounded–variable way as de-
scribed in Section 4.1. Equation (5) presents the SBM Model B extended, which contains an
environmental standard in the fourth constraint and weak disposability in the fifth constraint.
In order to distinguish direct and indirect effects of environmental standards, it is advantageous
to implement the regulatory and the weak disposability constraint for different variables. This
means, as weak disposability refers to inputs within the SBM Model B framework, emission per
unit of output or level–of–emission regulation can be used as environmental standards. The
fourth constraint here, shows an emission per unit of output regulation.10
SBM Model B including bounded variables and weak disposability via inputs:
(Emission per unit of output regulation)
min
λ,s−,sb
ρ = 1−
1
m+ 2s2
(
m∑
i=1
s−i
xio
+
s2∑
r=1
sbr
ybro
+
s2∑
i,r=1
sWDr
xio
) (5)
10Recall that for a level–of–emission regulation the environmental standard has to be formulated as 0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α3.
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s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
yo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo ≤ Y
gλ
0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α2Y
gλ
sbr
ybro
=
sWDr
xio
λ, s−, sb, sWDr ≥ 0
Table 4 presents the eco–efficiency scores, ranks and reference sets of SBM Model B weak and
SBM Model B extended for the sample data. The results of the two models were again generated
using GAMS and are almost identical.11 Again, DMU D is no longer a valid projection possi-
bility at the efficiency frontier and consequently has to be projected on point D˜. The regulatory
impact on DMU D increases from an efficiency loss of 24% under strong disposability to 32%
under weak disposability. Same holds for DMU E where the regulatory impact increases from 5
to 7 percentage points. Consequently, the average regulatory impact over all eight firms is cal-
culated as an efficiency loss of 5 percentage points, also higher than under a strong disposability
assumption for undesirable outputs.
The increased regulatory impact shows that, when accounting for weak disposability the firms
have to undertake additional effort in order to fulfil the environmental standard. This result
highlights the importance of accounting for weak disposability when assessing the strength of
certain environmental regulations.12
Again, different values of α2 are considered in order to evaluate the regulatory impact of the
environmental standard. If α2 is for instance set to 1.5, the overall regulatory impact accounts
to 16 percentage points, which is around three times the effect of an environmental standard
of α2 = 3.5. For α2 = 1 it would again be most efficient for all firms to cease production
and leave the market. Detailed information about efficiency scores and regulatory impacts of
different environmental standards when accounting for weak disposability in the SBM Model B
framework can be found in Appendix D.
11Recall that the environmental standard was set to Y
b
Y g
≤ 3.5.
12Moreover, it is interesting to compare the results of SBM Model B in Table 2 and SBM Model B weak in Table
4. Although referring to the same firms and efficiency frontier, the average efficiency score decreased from 0.80
to 0.76 when taking into account weak disposability of undesirable outputs.
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Table 4: Eco–efficiency Results — Emission per unit of output regulation
SBM Model B weak SBM Model B extended Regulatory Impact
Score Rank Ref Score Rank Ref
DMU A 1 1 A 1 1 A
DMU B 1 1 B 1 1 B
DMU C 0.67 6 A,B 0.67 6 A,B
DMU D 1 1 D 0.68 3 D˜ 0.32
DMU E 0.76 5 B,D 0.69 5 D˜ 0.07
DMU F 0.42 8 A 0.42 8 A
DMU G 0.45 7 A 0.45 7 A
DMU H 0.77 4 A 0.77 4 A
∅ Efficiency 0.76 0.71 0.05
Table 5 shows coordinates of the efficiency–frontier projections in SBM model B extended for
single firms. The fourth column states that all projections fulfil the environmental standard
(Emission
Output
≤ 3.5), but due to weak disposability firms have to increase their inputs to the Input
weak–level. Consequently, no inefficient firm can reach the efficiency frontier within one period.
This is in line with Lozano and Gutierrez (2011) who also tried to account for weak disposability
in SBM models.
Table 5: Efficiency–Frontier Projections
Emission Input Output Emisison
Output
Input weak
DMU A 13 20 10 1.3 20
DMU B 24 15 10 2.4 15
DMU C 15.2 19 10 1.5 28.37
DMU D 28.34 11 8.10 3.5 16.33
DMU E 33.50 13 9.57 3.5 18.97
DMU F 13 20 10 1.3 52.62
DMU G 13 20 10 1.3 41.76
DMU H 13 20 10 1.3 27
4.2.2 Undesirable Output Model
Our weak disposability extensions to the Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007)
are included in Equation (6), this formulation is called Undesirable Output Model weak in the
remaining text. The Undesirable Output Model is non–oriented and thus includes slacks for
inputs, undesirable outputs and desirable outputs. Nevertheless, undesirable outputs are treated
as outputs wherefore weak disposability can only be implemented via outputs. The fourth
constraint presents the implementation via output decrease. As soon as a firm needs to decrease
emissions for reaching efficiency, it concurrently has to lower outputs proportional which is
accounted in the objective function by the weak disposability slack sWDr .
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Undesirable Output Model including weak disposability via outputs:
(Intensity regulation)
min
λ,s−,s+
ρ =
1− 1
m
∑m
i=1
s−i
xio
1 + 1
s1+2s2
(
∑s1
r=1
s
g
r
y
g
ro
+
∑s2
r=1
sbr
ybro
+
∑s2
r=1
sWDr
y
g
ro
)
(6)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
ybo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo = Y
gλ− sg
sbr
ybro
=
sWDr
y
g
ro
λ, s−, sg, sb, sWDr ≥ 0
Subsequently, the environmental standard is introduced (fourth constraint in Equation (7)).
Again due to clarity reasons, different variables should be used for the regulatory and weak
disposability constraint. Therefore, intensity and level–of–emission regulation can be used in
combination with weak disposability via outputs. The fourth constraint contains intensity regu-
lation as environmental standard on the efficiency frontier.13 This model is called Undesireable
Output Model extended in the remaining text.
Undesirable Output Model including bounded variables and weak disposability:
(Intensity regulation)
min
λ,s−,s+
ρ =
1− 1
m
∑m
i=1
s−i
xio
1 + 1
s1+2s2
(
∑s1
r=1
s
g
r
y
g
ro
+
∑s2
r=1
sbr
ybro
+
∑s2
r=1
sWDr
y
g
ro
)
(7)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
ybo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo = Y
gλ− sg
0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α1Xλ
sbr
ybro
=
sWDr
y
g
ro
λ, s−, sg, sb, sWDr ≥ 0
Table 6 presents the eco–efficiency scores, ranks and reference sets when applying the Undesirable
Output Model weak and the extended version from Equation (7) to the sample data. The
13Recall that for a level–of–emission regulation the environmental standard has to be formulated as 0 ≤ Y bλ ≤ α3.
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regulatory impact, given by the average efficiency loss in the industry, accounts to 5 percentage
points and DMU D is again most affected from an individual point of view. As the regulatory
impact is higher than under a strong disposability assumption, these results once again reveal
that accounting for weak disposability is necessary to evaluate the whole regulatory impact of
environmental standards.
In doing so, when decreasing α2 to 0.7 for instance, the only remaining efficient firm is DMU A.
Consequently, DMUs D,E and B lose efficiency. But the firms which were formerly projected in B
gain efficiency, because the efficiency frontier approaches them. The industry wide efficiency loss
is here computed with 8 percentage points, which also gives a higher difference than assuming
strongly disposable undesirable outputs. Setting α2 below 0.7, all firms will cease production
and leave the market. Detailed information about efficiency scores and regulatory impacts of
different environmental standards when accounting for weak disposability in the Undesirable
Output Model framework can be found in Appendix E.
Table 6: Eco–efficiency Results — Intensity regulation
Undesirable Output Model weak Undesirable Output Model extended Regulatory Impact
Score Rank Ref Score Rank Ref
DMU A 1 1 A 1 1 A
DMU B 1 1 B 1 1 B
DMU C 0.70 6 B 0.70 6 B
DMU D 1 1 D 0.71 5 D˜ 0.29
DMU E 0.79 5 D 0.72 4 D˜ 0.07
DMU F 0.37 8 B 0.37 8 B
DMU G 0.46 7 B 0.46 7 B
DMU H 0.81 4 A 0.81 3 A
∅ Efficiency 0.77 0.72 0.05
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we propose one approach to implement environmental standards into the DEA
framework and thereby to measure its regulatory impact on eco–efficiency. Herein, we distinguish
between strong and weak disposability of undesirable outputs. The presented model extensions
can help to assess the regulatory impact of environmental standards in advance. Referring to
an industry sample at one point in time, regulators can compare the efficiency scores of the
firms when applying a usual SBM model and the extended counterpart to this sample. The
difference in eco–efficiency scores can be interpreted as regulatory impact of the environmental
standard. The possibility to assess the regulatory impact in advance could provide support for
environmental policy makers in choosing appropriate instruments. Additionally, it should help
to evaluate and adjust the intensity of regulation before taking political action.
As one basic feature of the DEA models lies in the exogeneity of inputs, desirable and undesirable
outputs and the optimisation over weights, it is not possible to introduce constraints for these
parameters directly. Therefore, we implement the environmental standard using a bounded
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variables framework which allows constraints on the efficiency frontier. The regulatory impact
of the environmental standard on a particular firm is determined by the comparison of its eco–
efficiency scores before and after fictive introduction of the standard. The regulatory impact for
the industry is measured by comparison of average eco–efficiencies.
Assessing the regulatory impact is exclusively based on a comparison of eco–efficiency scores.
For that reason, a slack–based measure (SBM) framework, accounting for possible slacks, is more
advantageous for our purpose. Herein, two possible models for measuring eco–efficiency are con-
sidered: a SBM version of Model B from Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) and the Undesirable
Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007). These models constitute the starting point for method-
ological implementation of an environmental standard into the DEA framework. Moreover, we
distinguish between weak and strong disposability of undesirable outputs and develop according
models. Herein, weak disposability itself is an extension to common SBM eco–efficiency models.
Especially the huge flexibility in our proposed model framework comprises advantages for regu-
latory authorities and environmental policy makers. As the regulator can choose between two
general SBM model frameworks, three types of environmental standards and two weak dispos-
ability versions the model can be adopted to a wide range of industries. Moreover, assessing the
regulatory impact of environmental standards in advance can help choosing appropriate instru-
ments and a reasonable intensity of regulation.
The application of our proposed method to assess the regulatory impact of environmental stan-
dards in advance would be interesting for different industries and offers large scope for further
research. One interesting example is for instance to assess which environmental standard would
be most advantageous and effective in reducing emissions in electricity generation.
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APPENDIX
A Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al. (2007)
min
λ,s−,s+
ρ =
1− 1
m
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+
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)
(8)
s.t.:
xo = Xλ+ s
−
ybo = Y
bλ+ sb
ygo = Y
gλ− sg
λ, s−, sg, sb,≥ 0
B SBM Model B bounded
Table 7: Eco–efficiency Scores — Emission per unit of output regulation
SBM Model B 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 1
DMU A 1 1 1 1 1 -
DMU B 1 1 1 1 0.75 -
DMU C 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 -
DMU D 1 0.87 0.76 0.75 0.58 -
DMU E 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.76 0.58 -
DMU F 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 -
DMU G 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 -
DMU H 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 -
∅ Efficiency 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.68 -
Regulatory Impact 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.12 -
The second column gives the eco–efficiency scores using the standard SBM Model B. Columns 3 to 7 present the
eco–efficiency scores using SBM Model B bounded for different emission per unit of output regulations (Emission
Output
≤
α2). The heading gives the respective value of α2. The regulatory impact is computed as the deviation of eco–
efficiency scores from the average eco–efficiency score of SBM Model B. Note that DMUs A, F, G and H are not
affected by the environmental standard. This is because DMU A is eco–efficient under all analysed regulations and
each of the remaining DMUs is projected in A. For DMUs D and E the eco–efficiency score is constantly decreasing,
indicating that stricter environmental standards cost eco-efficiency. DMU C is projected on the efficiency frontier
between A and B. Since DMU B does also not fulfil the environmental standard of α2 = 1.5, the regulatory
constraint cuts the efficiency frontier between these two points. But as the eco–efficiency score of DMU C is not
changing, the cut must appear between the projection point of DMU C and DMU B. Summing up, the regulatory
impact for the whole industry is increasing with strength of regulation.
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C Undesirable Output Model bounded
Table 8: Eco–efficiency Scores — Intensity regulation
Undesirable Output Model 3 2 1 0.7 0.5
DMU A 1 1 1 1 1 -
DMU B 1 1 1 0.84 0.78 -
DMU C 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 -
DMU D 1 0.83 0.77 0.71 0.70 -
DMU E 0.80 0.84 0.76 0.72 0.70 -
DMU F 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.47 -
DMU G 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.56 0.60 -
DMU H 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 -
∅ Efficiency 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.74 -
Regulatory Impact 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 -
The second column gives the eco–efficiency scores using the standard Undesirable Output Model from Cooper et al.
(2007). Columns 3 to 7 present the eco–efficiency scores using the Undesirable Output Model bounded for different
intensity regulations (Emission
Input
≤ α1). The heading gives the respective value of α1. The regulatory impact is
computed as the deviation of eco–efficiency scores from the average eco–efficiency score of the Undesirable Output
Model from Cooper et al. (2007). Note that for DMUs D and E the eco–efficiency score is constantly decreasing,
whereas the eco–efficiency scores of DMU F,G and H are increasing as soon as DMU B is no longer eco–efficient.
This is because each of the three firms is projected on the efficiency frontier between A and B. If the environmental
standard cuts the efficiency frontier between these two points, the firms face a shorter projection way and thus
gain in eco–efficiency. Consequently, the regulatory impact for the whole industry is constant from a distinct
strength of regulation on.
D SBM Model B bounded and weak
Table 9: Eco–efficiency Scores — Emission per unit of output regulation
SBM Model B weak 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 1
DMU A 1 1 1 1 1 -
DMU B 1 1 1 1 0.66 -
DMU C 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.67 0.67 -
DMU D 1 0.82 0.68 0.56 0.44 -
DMU E 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.57 0.44 -
DMU F 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 -
DMU G 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 -
DMU H 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 -
∅ Efficiency 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.60 -
Regulatory Impact 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.16 -
The second column gives the eco–efficiency scores using SBM Model B weak. Columns 3 to 7 present the eco–
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efficiency scores using SBM Model B extended for different emission per unit of output regulations (Emission
Output
≤ α2).
The heading gives the respective value of α2. The regulatory impact is computed as the deviation of eco–efficiency
scores from the average eco–efficiency score of SBM Model B weak. Note that DMUs A, F, G and H are not affected
by the environmental standard. This is because DMU A is eco–efficient under all analysed regulations and each
of the remaining DMUs is projected in A. For DMUs D and E the eco–efficiency score is constantly decreasing,
indicating that stricter environmental standards cost eco-efficiency. DMU C is projected on the efficiency frontier
between A and B. Since DMU B also has to be projected for α2 = 1.5 the environmental standard cuts the
efficiency frontier between A and B. More precisely, the variation in eco–efficiency scores of DMU C indicates
that the cut appears between the projection point of DMU C and DMU A. Summing up, the regulatory impact
for the whole industry is increasing with strength of regulation on. Due to the weak disposability assumption the
eco–efficiency decrease is higher than under strong disposability of undesirable outputs.
E Undesirable Output Model bounded and weak
Table 10: Eco–efficiency Scores — Intensity regulation
Undesirable Output Model weak 3 2 1 0.7 0.5
DMU A 1 1 1 1 1 -
DMU B 1 1 1 0.80 0.73 -
DMU C 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.73 -
DMU D 1 0.79 0.71 0.65 0.64 -
DMU E 0.79 0.80 0.72 0.66 0.64 -
DMU F 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.44 -
DMU G 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.52 0.52 -
DMU H 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 -
∅ Efficiency 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.69 -
Regulatory Impact 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 -
The second column gives the eco–efficiency scores using the Undesirable Output Model weak. Columns 3 to 7
present the eco–efficiency scores using the Undesirable Output Model extended for different intensity regulations
(Emission
Input
≤ α1). The heading gives the respective value of α1. The regulatory impact is computed as the deviation
of eco–efficiency scores from the average eco–efficiency score of the Undesirable Output Model weak. Note that
for DMUs D and E the eco–efficiency score is constantly decreasing, whereas the eco–efficiency scores of DMU F
and G are increasing as soon as DMU B is no longer eco–efficient. This is because both firms are projected on
the efficiency frontier between A and B. If the environmental standard cuts the efficiency frontier between these
two points, the firms face a shorter projection way and thus gain in eco–efficiency. The eco–efficiency score of
DMU H under weak disposability is not affected, because DMU H is projected on DMU A from the beginning
on. Summing up, the regulatory impact for the whole industry is increasing with stricter regulation, this is due
to the weak disposability assumption.
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